Introduction

27
The geographical expansion of animal diseases traditionally thought of as exotic to the 28 European continent, for example, African swine fever (ASF), and lumpy skin disease 29 (LSD), are causing increasing concern to European Union (EU) member states (MS). The 30 steady movement of these diseases across European boundaries has required the EU to 31 put surveillance activities and mitigation programmes in place to prevent further spread. 32
Despite these preventive controls which significantly reduce the likelihood of spread, rare 33 geographical random jumps of pathogens can, and do, occur with the consequence that 34 introduction of an emerging disease into an EU MS may go undetected for a certain period 35 of time during which silent spread could occur. This has been demonstrated with the 2006 36
Bluetongue virus (BTV) serotype 8 appearance in the Netherlands [1] and the 2016 37 diagnosis of besnoitiosis in Ireland [2, 3] . 38
For the United Kingdom (UK), situated on the north western perimeter of Europe, national 39 surveillance of emerging exotic diseases has been assisted by the predominantly east to 40 west/south to north direction of spread allowing the progressive reporting of outbreaks in 41 individual MSs to be monitored and continually reassessed. The data generated by these 42 outbreaks can be used in risk assessments with particular emphasis on the probability of 43 introduction from continental Europe to the UK [4] . The island status of the UK needs to be 44 accounted for when assessing the probability of disease incursion with the surrounding 45 water boundary likely to affect pathogen incursion via routes such as vector movements [4] 46 and wild animals [5] . 47
Lumpy skin disease came to particular prominence in 2016 as an exotic disease that 48 emerged as a major threat to European cattle populations. It is a viral disease of cattle 49 (Bos indicus and B. taurus) and water buffalo (Bubalus bubalis) and is categorised as a 50 notifiable disease by the World Organisation for Animal health (OIE) [6] . The disease is 51 present in most, if not all, African countries and is now considered endemic in Turkey [7] . 52
Since 2012, LSD has spread from the Middle East to south east Europe, affecting EU MSs 53 (Greece and Bulgaria) and several other countries in the Balkans. This spread has been 54 rapid, possibly aided by civil unrest and the breakdown of veterinary services in countries 55 such as Iraq and Syria [8] . Since 2015 in south east Europe there have been over 7,600 56 outbreaks with 12,800 affected animals [7] . Indirect production losses are incurred by 57 control and eradication measures and restrictions/total ban of international trade of live 58 cattle and their products. 59
Lumpy skin disease has never been reported in the UK but, given the current situation 60 within the EU, assessing the probability of incursion is important to inform surveillance 61 activities and national policy regarding risk mitigation. This qualitative assessment focuses 62 on the probability of LSD virus (LSDV) introduction into the UK within the time period June 63 2017 to June 2018. The probability of onward transmission, were disease incursion to 64 occur within the UK, was also assessed. Factors with high uncertainty were identified to 65 emphasise their impact on the assessment conclusions and future research requirements. 66 3 Such research would assist risk assessors in making more robust conclusions for national 67 preparedness and mitigation strategy prioritisation. 68 The risk pathway highlighting the potential routes of introduction of LSDV into the UK 85 within the next year is shown in Figure 1 . Disease introduction was defined as the 86 presence of an LSDV positive vector or animal/animal product in the UK and included the 87 probability of detection at post-import testing. Onward transmission to UK cattle, given 88 introduction has occurred, is described in the second pathway ( Figure 2 ) using the outputs 89 from Figure 1 (infected live animals, contaminated animal products and infected vectors) 90 as sources of LSDV. The primary routes of introduction and onward transmission 91 considered were based on literature reviews and expert opinion. 92
Material and Methods
The qualitative estimates for the combined probability of introduction and onward 93 transmission for individual routes i.e. live animals, animal products and vectors were 94 derived using a matrix approach as described previously [12] . wildebeest and impala are also assessed acknowledging the very limited detection of 106 LSDV seropositive results in documented studies [13] [14] [15] . The probability that an infected 107 live animal is consigned (i.e. intra-community trade) or exported (i.e. from outside the EU) 108 to the UK was estimated from the number of animals arriving from each country of origin 109 and the presence of LSDV infection in those countries. These data were then combined 110 with the probability of the infected animal surviving the journey from its country of origin 111 and the probability of it being detected at destination, depending on the incubation period, 112
clinical infection and post-import test sensitivity. Countries for which post-import testing 113 within the UK is required for compliance checks and those in which an LSD outbreak has 114 been reported to the OIE for the years 2015 -2016 are referred to as 'at risk' countries 115 hereon in. Both illegal and legal trade were assessed. The final estimate is the probability 116 that an infected animal enters the UK from any other country of origin. 117
The estimate of the probability that onward transmission of LSDV could occur within the 118 UK from the introduction of an infected animal considers transmission via local competent 119 vectors, directly via animal to animal or indirectly via fomites, iatrogenic, germplasm, feed 120 or water (Figure 2 
Animal products 131
The probability that an LSDV infected product enters the UK from any affected country 132 was estimated by combining the probabilities of an infected product being consigned or 133 exported to the UK, survival time of the virus within the product and whether or not it would 134 be detected at destination. The animal products considered were germplasm; hides and 135 skins; meat and milk products. The assessment considers the presence of contamination 136 5 in the product at source and any reduction in viral load which may occur during the time 137 taken for travel to the UK including any processing effects. 
Results
156
Probability of introduction 157
The probability of introduction of LSDV into the UK via each route considered was 158 calculated by combining the relevant steps in the risk pathway ( Figure 1 ) as described 159 previously [12] . The probability was estimated to be very low for vectors and both illegal 160 and legal trade of livestock, skins/hides and meat/milk products. All other routes were 161 considered to have a negligible probability of introduction (Table 2) . 162
No animals were consigned from 'at risk' countries (see Table 1 ) to the UK in the last 12 163 months. In order for the UK to legally trade an infected animal, the disease would need to 164 have spread undetected into one of the UK's trading partners and would, therefore, in all 165
likelihood, be at a very low prevalence. The numbers of animals traded by the UK from the 166 MSs concerned, were also relatively low (See Appendix). It is likely that the highest risk 167 would be from breeding or production stock rather than slaughter animals as they would 168 have a longer period of time to make further contacts with other live animals or vectors. 169
Based on these considerations, the probability that an infected animal is legally consigned 170 to the UK within the next year was considered to be very low. Although LSD has been 171 endemic in Africa for decades no actual cases have been reported in wildlife and 172 6 prevalence by antibody detection has been reported to be very low [13] [14] [15] suggesting that 173 exotic animals (i.e. non-livestock) are unlikely to be important in the epidemiology of LSD. 174
The import from third countries of such animals is covered by strict regulations under EU 175 rules and the risk of introduction via the exotic animal route was thus estimated as 176 negligible. 177
The probability that an infected animal survives the journey from the country of origin to 178 the UK was considered to be high given the relatively low mortality rate but the probability 179 that an infected animal is not detected on arrival was considered to be very low for 'at risk' 180 countries due to the post-import testing regime in place. For animals consigned from non-181 risk countries the probability was assessed as medium assuming that only 50% of infected 182 animals show clinical symptoms [19] and that no testing on arrival would occur. 183
No bovine germplasm (semen or embryos) were traded from 'at risk' countries during the 184 year 2016. It is likely that once an LSD outbreak has been confirmed in a herd all animal 185 products, including semen, would be destroyed. The probability of LSDV infected 186 germplasm being legally consigned to the UK was therefore considered to be negligible. 187
The probability of any virus surviving in semen was, however, estimated to be high as it 188 was assumed that semen will be transported as frozen straws thereby preserving any virus 189 within it [20] . 190
For the year 2016 the number of intra EU imports of hides into the UK is not known as they 191
are not recorded in TRACES, but instead rely on commercial documentation. Imports from 192 third countries (i.e. those outside of the EU) were from Australia, China and the USA. The 193 probability of untreated LSD infected animal hides or skins being legally exported to the 194 UK from a third country was therefore considered to be very low. Untreated products 195 consigned from within the EU must only originate from a country which is approved for the 196 import of fresh or frozen meat or products for human consumption [21] and be destined for 197 an approved processing plant within the EU. Otherwise, skins and hides must be 198 processed in an EU approved establishment in the country of origin. Skin/hides are likely 199 to be transported to the UK via trucks and ships with temperatures below 37 o C and in the 200 dark; hence it is likely that little or no inactivation of the virus would occur during transport 201
[22] particularly in those products which do not undergo specific inactivating treatment [19] . 202
The probability of virus surviving in infected hides/skins was therefore assessed to be high 203 but the probability of not being detected on import was considered to be low due to the 204 identifiable nodules and scabs on the products. 205
Concerning milk and milk products, while there is some experimental evidence that 206 conditions equivalent to the low temperature / long time pasteurisation method inactivate 207 capripoxvirus (62 o C for 30 minutes) [23, 24] there is no available data on pasteurisation at 208 72 o C; furthermore, the presence of fat, protein and other solids in milk may protect the 209 virus thereby decreasing the inactivation rate compared to that of virus in a laboratory 210
buffer. There is therefore insufficient evidence on both the presence of virus in milk and 211 whether pasteurisation inactivates LSD virus to a negligible level. However, the OIE code 212 7
[25] recommends that pasteurisation of milk or any combination of control measures with 213 equivalent performance as described in the Codex Alimentarius Code of Hygienic Practice 214
for Milk and Milk Products [26] is a suitable prerequisite to import of these products. There 215 is no public health risk of LSD from meat products and therefore the trade in meat is not 216 subject to risk management procedures. The probability of meat/milk products infected 217 with LSDV being consigned to the UK was therefore considered to be very low with the 218 probability of LSDV surviving in these products also assessed as very low assuming that 219 all dairy products would be pasteurised for human consumption in accordance with the 220 OIE recommendations. The probability of infected germplasm or meat and milk products 221 not being detected on arrival was considered to be high as no physical signs of 222 contamination will be evident and no post-import tests are currently carried out. 223
In order to estimate the probability of introduction of LSDV into the EU via the illegal 224 movement of animals, the number of animals that need to be moved to have a probability 225 of introduction of LSDV into Europe of greater than 0.95 was calculated to be above 1,300 226 (for country seroprevalence equal to 30%), or above 7,800 (for country seroprevalence 227 equal to 5 %) i.e. a large and likely improbable number of animals [27] . The logistics and 228 costs involved of illegally transporting cattle from mainland Europe to the UK is another 229 mitigating factor against this event occurring. Contradicting this is the high chance of virus 230 survival and the fact that no post-import testing would be carried out on illegally 231 transported animals. As such the probability that an LSDV infected livestock animal is 232 illegally transported to the UK was considered to be very low. The probability is reduced to 233 negligible for exotic animals due to the assumption that non-livestock animals are not 234 important in terms of LSDV transmission and do not act as a reservoir of disease. 235
For illegal products, the probability of infected germplasm being consigned to the UK was 236 considered to be negligible due to the availability of cheap and health tested products 237 legally available in the UK. The probability for meat and milk products was assessed as 238 very low although it is unknown whether large scale consignments might occur or whether 239 illegal trade or imports may only be occurring as goods for personal consumption. The 240 probability of illegally importing untreated hides/skins was also estimated as very low. 241
Although these products can be of high value, thereby increasing the likelihood of them 242 being imported as a commodity for onward sale, it was assumed that hides spoiled by skin 243 lesions would not be selected for export. The probability that animal products illegally 244 consigned from the EU into the UK are not detected was assessed as high for germplasm 245 and meat/milk products and medium for hides/skins. The latter has a slightly higher 246 likelihood of being detected due to the size of the product and the probability that they will 247 be shipped as bulk imports rather than personal imports. There are no checks carried out 248 on passengers and trade products for intra EU trade. 249
The possibility of long term virus survival in vector populations cannot be excluded with 250 certainty [28] . Vectors have been previously implicated in transboundary cases of LSD e.g. 251 the first cases in Greece were suspected of coming from Turkey via vector movement [29] . 252 However, these are neighbouring countries unlike the UK and mainland Europe which are 253 8 separated by a ~ 33 km stretch of water. Modelling of LSDV transmission suggests that 254 vector borne transmission is responsible for short distance transmission only [30] . For this 255 reason the probability that an infected vector will reach the UK successfully within the next 256 year was assessed as being very low. 257
Uncertainty associated with the probability of introduction of LSD virus into the UK 258
Qualitative uncertainty scores for the routes of introduction are shown in Table 3. The  259 highest levels of uncertainty were associated with the introduction of LSDV via legal and 260 illegal meat and milk products and via vectors. High uncertainty surrounds all of these 261 estimates due to the lack of robust scientific evidence and lack of data on the numbers 262 involved. The uncertainty associated with the vector route is high due to the unknown 263 vector species involved (and therefore its associated mode of entry to the UK) and 264 whether biological transmission or only mechanical transmission is involved which will 265 influence virus survival on or within the vector. 266
A level of medium uncertainty was derived for the trade of infected livestock to the UK as 267 the complete movement history of the animals is unknown and the time between disease 268 incursion within a country and disease detection, which is dependent on the clinical signs 269 and the methods of surveillance and post-import test sensitivity, was unknown and likely to 270 be variable. During this window movement of potentially infected animals could occur. The 271 uncertainty score for exotic animals, however, was considered to be very low due to the 272 robust scientific data available on the very low levels of natural infection in this population. 273
The lack of data on the number of hides traded around the EU and undergoing different 274 preservation treatments and the effect of those treatments on LSDV makes it difficult to 275 estimate virus survival. An assessment of medium uncertainty for the virus surviving the 276 journey on these products was therefore assumed. However, there was low uncertainty 277 concerning the probability of not being detected on arrival as nodules and scabs are likely 278 to be evident on the product thereby identifying infected items. 279 Uncertainty surrounding the probability that an LSDV infected livestock animal or exotic 280 animal is illegally imported to the UK was considered to be low. Conversely, a high level of 281 uncertainty was associated with the probability of animal products being illegally imported 282 into the UK due to the unknown number of illegal consignments. 283
Probability of onward transmission 284
The probability of onward transmission of LSDV, assuming introduction to the UK, and the 285 associated uncertainty for all of the assessed routes is shown in Table 4 . The probability of 286 direct animal to animal transmission was considered to be very low as the basic 287 reproduction number (R0) of this mode of transmission has been calculated to be 0. . The probability of onward 305 transmission via germplasm was therefore assumed to be very low. The probability of 306 onward transmission via fomites, food or water was assumed to be low due to the lack of 307 evidence of this transmission occurring but acknowledging the potential of the virus to 308 survive for long periods at ambient temperatures (for up to 6 months if protected from 309 sunlight), and the fact it survives well at cold temperatures. 310
The probability of a competent vector contacting an LSDV infected skin/hide or meat 311 product was considered to be negligible. Lumpy skin disease virus is considered to be 312 transmitted mainly through haematophagus vectors which do not bite bloodless hides or 313 skins; therefore, even if the virus on or in insufficiently treated hides was imported, further 314 transmission would not take place [27] . Meat is not considered to be a significant risk for 315 transmission for LSDV [28] and untreated hides/skins go straight to a designated 316 processing plant for treatment; the transmission route between an infected meat product or 317 hide/skin and a susceptible animal was considered unlikely [6] . 318
The probability that a native vector would contact an LSDV infected animal was 319 considered to be high depending on the competence of native vectors in the UK for 320 transmitting the virus and the co-occurrence of such a vector and infected host. Whilst the 321 competency of vectors in the UK is currently unknown the fact that the disease has moved 322 steadily up from southern Africa through many different climatic zones involving potentially 323 many different vectors suggests that it is also likely to be transmitted by vectors present in 324 the UK. The probability of an infected vector contacting a susceptible host and initiating 325 onward transmission was also assessed as high. Proximity to livestock, warm 326 temperatures and vector abundance are among the main risk factors for LSD spread. The 327 R0 value induced by indirect transmission has been estimated at 15.7. Sensitivity analysis 328
showed that this result was robust to a wide range of assumptions regarding mean and 329 standard deviation of incubation period and regarding the existence of sub-clinically 330 infected cattle [30] . This indirect transmission was assumed to be vector mediated and the 331 efficiency of transmission of an infected vector to a naïve animal was therefore assumed to 332 be high. 333 overall negligible probability with regards to disease incursion (Table 5) . For livestock and 353 vectors the overall probability was considered to be very low as dictated by the very low 354 probability of introduction into the UK despite the high probability of onward transmission 355
Uncertainty associated with the probability of onward transmission of LSD virus within the
should an introduction event occur. As stated previously, these probabilities are associated 356 with often high uncertainty due to lack of robust scientific evidence. 357
Discussion
358
This risk assessment has estimated the probability of incursion into, and onward 359 transmission of LSDV within, the UK. In doing so it has highlighted those knowledge gaps 360 with significant impact on the uncertainty associated with the overall conclusions. Whilst 361 the assessment was UK centric the knowledge gaps are generic and relevant to the 362 uncertainty surrounding the probability of introduction and spread in any geographical 363 region. Overall the probability of LSDV being introduced to the UK was considered, at 364 most, to be very low for all routes with the exception of exotic animals and germplasm 365 (negligible). The probability of onward transmission was considered highest for vector 366 mediated routes either via contact of an infected vector with a susceptible cattle or contact 367 of a competent native vector with infected cattle. The probability of onward transmission is, 368 however, likely to be reduced once the first case of LSD has been detected if vaccination 369 is undertaken. Risk-based vaccination, to avert the spread of the disease, may even be 370 carried out in the UK if LSD is detected in mainland northern Europe as has recently been 371 recommended with regard to countries that have not yet been affected by LSD but are 372 considered at risk [34] . 373
For the live animal import or trade route, it was considered that entry of disease would 374 require infected animals entering the UK from a country which was currently not classed 375 as 'at risk' and where no UK post-import testing for LSDV is required. Such countries 376 would be those which had previously imported or consigned animals from an 'at risk' 377 country or those that were in close enough proximity to infected countries whereby virus 378 could have entered their cattle populations as a result of transboundary vector and/or 379 cattle movements. Infection and exportation of an animal to the UK would rely on a series 380 of events whereby infection goes undetected and the animal selected for export comes 381 from the same herd (or neighbouring herd to allow for short distance vector transmission) 382 which had previously imported an animal from an 'at risk' country. This very low risk is, 383 however, likely to be mitigated by the regulated vaccination of cattle carried out by 384 countries currently affected by LSDV and their neighbouring countries. 385
In the unlikely event that the disease spreads undetected into western continental Europe 386 (to Germany or the Netherlands for example), the likelihood of consigning an infected 387 animal into the UK from a country that is erroneously believed to be uninfected, could 388 increase due to subclinical or incubation period infection. Using the European Food Safety 389
Authority (EFSA) model, if seroprevalence of LSDV in the country of origin was 5%, but 390 currently undetected, the import of 140 or 7,809 animals from that country would give a 391 probability of introduction of 5% or 95% respectively. The highest number of cattle 392 imported into the UK during 2016 was 4,074 from the Republic of Ireland (ROI). According 393
to the same EFSA model, if seroprevalence of LSDV was 5% and undetected in the ROI 394 then the probability of introduction into the UK would be ~ 75% using 2016 trade data [27] ; 395 this scenario is, however, extremely unlikely due to the control and prevention measures 396 put in place by EU MSs. 397
Within the UK, preliminary outbreak assessments are undertaken by the Government on 398 notification of a disease outbreak from the EU or OIE. These assessments indicate the 399 threat of the disease incident at present and in the future and are used to inform the 400 Governments' advice and consideration of preventative controls. For LSD, however, 401 medium to high uncertainty surrounds the probability of introduction to the UK via several 402 of the routes assessed here. These are the initial stages of the risk pathway and therefore 403 all assessments made consequential to these probabilities are underpinned by high 404 uncertainty. Previous risk assessments have so far assumed 2 routes of spread, that is, 405 direct and indirect but they can only assume that the more rapid local spread is vector 406 borne and longer distance transmission is direct spread due to cattle movements [30, 35] . 407
The accuracy of the calculation of R0 for LSDV, i.e. the number of cases one infected case 408 can generate over the course of its infectious period, could be greatly improved if the 409 vectors involved in transmission were definitively identified. This would allow for vector 410 abundance to be taken into account [36] 
